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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

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Remarks

Executive Secretary

6/20/84  
Date

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S 15800

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

November 9, 1983

comes to handing out public benefits, secrecy can work very much against the general interest—witness the pork-barrel grab typical of closed appropriation subcommittee sessions.

By and large, the current rule seems to work well. Open sessions should be the general practice. But if a majority of a committee's members feels that a closed session is more appropriate for a particular measure, they should be willing to vote on the record for that decision. If the thing gets out of hand, you can be sure there will be plenty of noise about it.

## ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, there are a few odds and ends that may be taken care of which may or may not have been cleared by the minority leader. We will know in a few moments.

In the meantime, I invite Senators who have remarks to make in morning business to do so now, and I will try to get the Senate out as soon as possible.

I remind Senators that tomorrow we have an order for the Senate to convene at 9 a.m.

## ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR MOYNIHAN ON TOMORROW

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the two leaders are recognized tomorrow under the standing order, the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. MOYNIHAN) be recognized on special order for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## SENATE PROCEDURE ON TOMORROW

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the execution of the special order tomorrow, the time remaining before 10:15 a.m. be devoted to the transaction of routine morning business, in which Senators may speak for not more than 2 minutes each; that at 10:15 a.m., the Senate resume consideration of the pending business, which is the civil rights reauthorization bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I think the better part of discretion would be to resume consideration of the pending bill at 10 a.m. instead of 10:15, and I ask unanimous consent that the order be amended in that fashion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## A BREACH OF SECURITY

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I wish to make a brief report to the Senate with respect to a report of a breach of security which has occurred at the Department of State.

Yesterday about 10 o'clock in the morning I received a telephone call from James Adams, who is a reporter for Metromedia Television News. He said that it was a matter that involved national security, and I agreed to meet with him.

Subsequently, I saw Mr. Adams early in the afternoon, and at that time he told me that he had received a call from Lorton Reformatory where one of the inmates had advised him that he, the inmate, was in possession of certain documents which purported to be classified papers from the Department of State.

Mr. Adams said that he went out last Friday and did in fact receive these documents from the inmate, Charles Cox; that he, Mr. Adams, was prepared to turn them over to the Department of State, without using the information contained in the documents and without making any copies of the documents on the condition that I would accompany him to the Department of State and that a responsible official of the Department of State would receive the documents.

There was an implication in Mr. Adams' request that I was asked to go in order to insure that appropriate legislative oversight in this matter would be applied.

Under those circumstances, I agreed to accompany him to the State Department and did so, and Mr. Adams delivered to Mr. Shumate, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, an envelope containing documents of varying degrees of security classification.

Mr. Shumate, who was the Acting Assistant Secretary of State, received the documents. He advised that the Department of State had recovered other classified material from Lorton Reformatory and advised that a departmental investigation was already underway.

I told him of the obvious interest of the Committee on Foreign Relations in this breach of security, that I was sure the committee would not only want to be advised of the results of the departmental investigation but would in fact probably want to make its own inquiries into the matter.

I am told today that the departmental investigation is going forward,

so I wish to assure Senators that the matter is receiving the attention at the very highest level in the State Department.

I have also advised the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. PEARCE, as well as the majority leader of the Senate, and so they are fully informed as to the matter.

In closing, I wish to comment very briefly on the actions taken by James Adams, of Metromedia News, who I think has acted with a remarkable degree of responsibility. These documents had obvious sensational value simply because of the classification stamped on them. And he could have exploited that value for news purposes. He avoided that sensationalism by agreeing to turn the documents over without disclosing the text. I think this is an act of restraint on his part which is noteworthy. In an age in which we accuse the press of sensationalism, it is an act of restraint that I think should be noted here in the Senate.

I am also constrained to mention the action of the inmate, Charles Cox, who also showed a sense of responsibility by delivering the documents to Mr. Adams and by requesting that Mr. Adams turn them over to the proper authority. I have not talked to Mr. Cox. I do not know what motivated him, but clearly the action he took was a responsible one.

So, Mr. President, Senators may rest assured that although this is a serious matter it is being dealt with in a serious way and the proper committees of Congress will receive reports as soon as the information is available.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## THE EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I have consulted with the minority leader by telephone. He has authorized me to say that the nomination that we were working for clearance on both sides which could not be included in our prior action has now been cleared on his side. It is also cleared on this side.

## EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now go into executive session for the sole purpose of considering the nomination of Maj. Gen. Paul W. Myers, U.S. Air Force, to be lieutenant general.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

Executive Secretary


4/12/84

Date

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
WASHINGTON



April 12, 1984

ATTN-

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William J. Casey  
Director of  
Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : INR Damage Assessment of the Lorton Incident

Bill,  
1. My staff has completed a detailed review of the FBI external report on the investigation of the Lorton incident. The report deals with the storage and handling of the classified material once it left the Department until its discovery at the Lorton Reformatory.

2. Based on a review of the FBI report, it appears that of the documents which were discovered at Lorton, only two must be considered compromised (in the sense that they were handled by unauthorized persons):

--The 23 March 1983 Secretary's Morning Summary  
(with backup)

--The 1959 Berlin Situation Document - which was not shipped out with the Secretary's Summaries, but turned up as a result of the investigation. (The best estimate is that the Berlin document may have been sent to Lorton by the Department along with a donation of books some time ago.)

--Also, there are no indications of an attempt to contact foreign governments or their representatives by unauthorized personnel who had access to the documents.

3. My staff discussed its conclusions with the FBI investigators, and they concur that only these two documents must be considered to have been compromised. At the same time, and

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even in the absence of any evidence of compromise, prudence dictates that we cannot totally and flatly exclude a possible, albeit unlikely, exposure of other material to unauthorized recipients.

4. In addition, the FBI has designated Agent Chuck Stapleton, 324-4660, as its point of contact to arrange briefings for interested agencies to discuss the FBI's findings and conclusions, in the event you would like additional details.

5. As you may be aware, in compliance with a request made by the FBI, INR temporarily embargoed access to the original documents. The FBI has now informed INR that it has completed all investigations associated with the documents. Interested Security Officers whom you may wish to review your agency's documents may contact my Security Branch on 632-1746 to arrange an appointment to do so.

6. I hope this is the concluding chapter in this lamentable affair. *Thank you for your understanding and*

*for assistance.*

  
Hugh Montgomery

CONFIDENTIAL



# **EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT** **ROUTING SLIP**

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Executive Secretary  
1 February 1984

Date

3637 (10-81)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Casey  
Director of  
Central IntelligenceSUBJECT : Lorton Investigation *attached*

13:11  
1. You will be receiving separately a sanitized copy of the Department of State Inspector General's report on the Lorton incident. The only omissions are the names of individuals involved excised for reasons of privacy. I have not yet received the FBI report which is critical to the definitive damage assessment analysis.

2. Although the FBI investigative report is not yet in hand, discussions with the Bureau reveal the following encouraging aspects of their investigation:

--The Lorton inmate most directly involved in the incident was given a polygraph examination, leading the FBI to believe that he made no attempt to contact a foreign government regarding the documents.

--The original summaries for the period 1 January to 23 March 1983 were turned over to the FBI for investigative purposes. A random sampling of these summaries in no instance turned up the fingerprints of the inmate mentioned above.

3. It is too early to draw any conclusions without the FBI's report in hand. Nonetheless, I will make every effort to keep you informed of significant developments as they occur.

4. Attached for your background is a rough version of the news conference given by Assistant Secretary Lamb on 24 January on this dreary subject.

5. As soon as we have the FBI's report in hand, we shall prepare our best judgment of the damage resulting from this unfortunate affair.

Attachment:

As Stated

*H. M.*  
Hugh MontgomeryCONFIDENTIAL  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING  
ON

LORTON PAPERS  
ROBERT E. LAMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
FOR ADMINISTRATION  
TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1984, 3:00 P.M.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY LAMB: Thank you very much.

I think you all have the Executive Summary for the inspection report on this, and so I would be happy to take questions.

Q Could you put it in plain, simple English for us, sir, how these documents got out of the State Department and into a prison? It's not in plain, simple English here.

A Yes, sir, I'll try. In mid July the ~~Bureau~~ Office of Intelligence and Research was involved in a microfilming project reducing their files. As a part of that project, they were able to release nine file cabinets. Seven of these went to the State Department warehouse in ~~New England~~ <sup>Newington</sup>, and subsequently some of these seven were included in a shipment of sixteen file cabinets declared as excess property. ~~They~~ <sup>They</sup> went to Lorton.

In one of these file cabinets, one of the <sup>about</sup> sixteen, there was two cubic feet of classified material.

That's one file drawer. This material was then discovered on October 25 by the Lorton officials. We were informed on that date and picked it up and brought it back to the Department.

We subsequently learned on November 8 that we had not gotten all of the classified material; <sup>that there was one;</sup> about 30 pages -- I've forgotten whether it's 31 or 32 -- that was given to us at that time by a reporter from Metromedia News.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell the American people at this time with certainty that, Number 1, the national security of the United States has not in anyway been put in jeopardy by this release of classified information to a prison; and that (2) you have a full accounting of all the top secret documents?

A We have conducted a very thorough investigation of the documents. The FBI and the Lorton officials have searched the Lorton facility. We had no indication that we have not gotten all of those documents back.

<sup>Now</sup> We are conducting a damage assessment with other elements of the intelligence community on whether there was any damage to our national security or not.

Obviously, the release of classified information

to a prison is not something that we're very happy about, but we have no indication now that there was any damage to our national security as a result of this.

Q Mr. Secretary, to follow, are you telling us right now that you really don't know if you have all the documents back in custody?

A I would rather put that in a different way because there's <sup>really</sup> no indication that we have not. We've inventoried all of these documents in INR, and there's no indication whatsoever that we did not get all of those documents back.

Q But one of the prisoners had access to a Xerox machine; right?

A Yes, sir. There <sup>are</sup> ~~are~~ Xerox machines and there were prisoners that have access to <sup>them</sup> ~~it~~.

Q So you don't know if they were duplicated?

A No, sir, we do not.

Q Let's mix in the memory typewriters, Mr. Secretary, and see what could have been produced from their memory banks, whether partial or whole pieces of data. What did you find?

A Let me just give you a little bit of background on that. We sent a shipment -- again, a part

of this excess property disposal program, <sup>through which</sup> ~~that~~ we sent a number of memory typewriters to Lorton. We found that in these typewriters there was ~~no~~ auxiliary memory that had not been adequately cleared and under laboratory conditions I understand the FBI was able to identify classified data on a couple, possibly three of these machines.

Q How many machines were there?

A There were five machines all together.

Q Do you know if they had been tapped or whether the material had been extracted? Did it show up in the documents you retrieved?

A It doesn't appear that they were. Let me tell you something that I think is important here. The State Department is responsible for the investigation in this building. The FBI assumed jurisdiction for the investigation at Lorton of those kinds of issues. We've worked very closely with the FBI on this but we do not have the FBI's final report.

Q <sup>No Secretary</sup> You have two very serious breaches of internal security here. First, how many individuals are involved; what are the range of disciplinary actions, and what is your general thought and characterization of how

this could happen in two different instances; have there been more?

A I have a little bit of trouble in saying how many -- answering your specific question about how many people were involved. But let me say that there is a range of disciplinary action. This runs everywhere from the reprimand <sup>of</sup> ~~to~~ an individual employee to dismissal with combinations of things in between.

Subsequent to this report, the Office of the Inspector General sent information to our Director General, and that's the office that is in charge of Personnel and it's in charge of disciplinary action, ~~with information~~ that is pertinent to the disciplining of some employees.

Q How many, perhaps; how many individuals?  
I know you can't give names but how many people?

A Three individuals.

Q What was the recommendation?

A I really can't speak <sup>to that</sup>. You can understand that this is now with the Director General, for the Director General's consideration, and I really can't speak to the question of recommendations or anything that might prejudice the rights of these particular employees.

Q You can't give us names, then?

A I cannot give you names; no, sir.

Q Can you tell us whether these people are still working at the same job?

A Yes, sir, they are.

Q They're working at the same job?

A These people are working still here in the Department. But let me say that we have taken a number of steps in INR to tighten procedures so that something like this doesn't happen again.

Q Can you explain what those recommendations are to tighten the procedures so that it won't happen again?

A Let me tell you sort of the areas generally. If that's not specific enough, I'll come back at it again for you.

There were several areas where we have addressed it. It goes beyond these three ~~or other~~ employees. These are the things that we've tried to do Department-wide.

We have tightened our system of unit security officers. We have tightened our procedures for the disposal of property and the accountability of property, and we've introduced a better training program for the unit security officers.



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Q Can you give us the ranks of the three individuals and whether they're Foreign Service or General Schedule?

A No, sir. I cannot.

Q Why can't you?

A I don't know.--

Q You just don't know what their --

A I don't know that information.

Q But we have been given a summary, a so-called "executive summary" of this report. Are we going to be given the report?

A Let me be quite honest with you on this. That causes us some difficulty. We've tried to do a very thorough report, we've tried to do a complete report, and I certainly don't want it to appear that we're hiding anything in this. But we are -- there are -- in the report we deal with the question of possible <sup>L</sup>capability of individual employees, we deal with the types of material that were -- that was involved, and these are things that we obviously have an obligation to protect. And there's also this question of the FBI investigation under way, and one of the things that they're looking at is whether <sup>there will be</sup> ~~this is~~ criminal prosecution, and I think that we have to be very careful that we don't do anything that would undermine their efforts.

Q Excuse me. Are you saying that the executive summary, then, is not complete in some way, that it would

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have to be classified if you gave us a total summary?

A I don't know what a "total summary" is.  
This is a summary of the --

Q Well, a summary that would cover these sensitive areas you're talking about.

A This is intended to be, and as far as I know it is, a summary -- this is a summary of the entire report. We have not tried to hide any of the facts in it.

Q <sup>Correct</sup> Could you tell us, please -- that you said earlier -- I think you said earlier that there was now under way a damage assessment with the intelligence community? Is that right?

A Yes, sir.

Q What does that mean exactly? Which communities, and what do you mean by a "damage assessment"? Do you mean sources and other countries might have been affected negatively?

A That's one of the things that this particular assessment looks at. Now, there's certainly no indication that that's happened. The damage assessment is done whenever there is a possible compromise of any -- a compromise or any possible compromise of a classified document. This is conducted by the agencies that have an interest in the document, or the information contained in the document, and it's an effort to go through the document and find out what damage

b-3

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might have happened through the incident, where it might have -- this information might have gone, and, if the information got to those places, what damage does this do to our national interest. Is that clear?

Q Well, let me just follow that, then. If the information that you're looking into contained foreign sources, names, information passed on by foreign sources, do you know at this point whether foreign sources of information have dried up as a result of this kind of hemorrhaging?

A This would be the kind of thing that the damage assessment would look at. But let me say as far as I know right now, there's no indication that that happened.

Q It's quite possible there's no harm at all?

Q Could I ask you, quite apart from the Administrative information which you've given here about how the material was transferred to Lorton and so on, could you go into a little bit of an explanation of why the Department did not take any action until October 25th? Why it did not act on additional information or make an additional search on that other information until September 8th when a reporter ended up with this stuff? And why it wasn't until Secretary Shultz was enroute to Asia and had to be sort of stopped, called aside, and given the information in Alaska after a week and a half or perhaps more had gone by when this security breach was known by the Department? How did that happen?

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A We learned about this on October 25. On October 25 we thought that we had gotten all of the information back from Lorton. We had at that point instituted a damage assessment and an investigation. It was not, however, until November 8 that we had any information that all of the documents were not back. It was on November 8 that we then knew of the magnitude of the problem, and it was at that time that we informed the Secretary.

Now, it's a little dramatic to say he was stopped and pulled aside. It was true that he was notified at Elmendorf Air Force Base on his way to Asia.

Q But most of the material, the vast bulk of the classified material, highly classified material, was known to the Department on October 25. Wasn't the Secretary of State told that some of his most sensitive papers had been in a prison in Northern Virginia?

Why wasn't he told before it got into the hands of a reporter and was published?

A At that time the people responsible wanted to get the information about the incident, and it really did not seem to be -- at that point it looked like all of the information had come back, and it looked like it was something that we could deal with within the security and intelligence communities in terms of finding out what had happened and making sure that it didn't happen again.

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Q Wouldn't it be a more realistic conclusion to simply draw the conclusion that at lower levels of the bureaucracy everybody was embarrassed that this could happen, and they were hoping to keep Shultz from finding out about it?

A Oh, absolutely not. That's not true at all. I think we were all embarrassed about it. I think the entire Department was embarrassed about it. But that was not the reason that the Secretary was not informed.

Q Could I ask about those 31 or 32 documents? What precisely were they?

A Okay. Just to clarify that, that was 31 <sup>or</sup> 32 pages. That was one copy of the Secretary's morning summary for March 23. ←

Q And that's all?

A That's all.

Q You mentioned that the report looks into the question of criminal prosecution. Criminal prosecution against whom, and is that still a possibility?

A Yes. It's a possibility. This is what the -- and I must say, I can't really speak for that, because this is something -- a determination has to be made by the Justice Department based on the FBI investigation. That would be -- it would be prosecution under 18 U.S. Code 793.

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Q Is that against those three individuals that you mentioned before?

A I really can't speak to that, because this is part of the FBI investigation which I really do not know. I just can't say.

Q Mr. Secretary, presumably some of these classified documents were read by convicted felons in Lorton. Is there any process by which they can be prevented from passing on whatever they picked up?

A There is no indication right now that there was widely -- that these documents were widely read by anyone at Lorton or anywhere else outside of the Department. But we -- again, this question of what damage was done, who could have read it, and to whom they could have passed the information is subject to the damage assessment.

Q Mr. Secretary, how can you be confident at all that you have a handle on how many documents really were there, since we were told at the outset that quite a number of these documents were handwritten pieces of paper which were on their way to being microfiched when they were taken out of the building? How do you know?

A It's not my understanding that a significant part of these classified documents were handwritten documents. That's something that's entirely new to me. These were documents that were kept in a chronological sequence. It

b-7

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was a fixed block of documents such that it was fairly easy for us to inventory in relative terms, and it's fairly easy for us to determine the completeness of the documents.

Q Mr. Secretary, it says here that no further search for documents was routinely accomplished once the property left the office disposing of it.

Why did the search end at that time? Was it assumed that they were lost in this disposal of excess property? Why did the person know to stop searching at that point?

A Oh, I think that -- I would have to go back and read that, but I think what they're saying there, that within the warehouse itself there was no search of the equipment -- of the files that were being sent out, and I think they're pointing to that as a lapse in our own procedures.

(Continued on next page)

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Q My recollection was that during the full search of Lorton -- after -- another, much older document turned up.

A That's correct.

Q That's not listed here, though. That's not mentioned here in your summary.

A It happened, and certainly, there was no intent on our part to hide that. I don't recall whether it's mentioned there, but this did happen. This is <sup>2</sup> something that we're working with the FBI on, to determine how it happened, and again, this is something that would be a subject of the damage assessment. But there was one document that was found at Lorton that appeared to have gone to Lorton prior to this shipment.

Q And my recollection was that it was a Berlin paper of 1961 or something like that.

A I don't, frankly, know that. I'd be afraid to go on the record with the subject of that because I'm just not sure. I have not seen the document; but it is my understanding that it dates from 1959.

7/11/61 Secretary  
Q Did evidence come forward to suggest that this was an isolated incident -- the two incidents, the earlier paper and this set of papers?



*Tie*  
A This shipment to Lorton was a unique incident.

62 I think that we've gotten out of this, though, a very --

I think we've gotten some rather positive lessons that we've learned out of it. I think we've found an instance here of a laxity in our procedures and some places where some of our employees were not doing all of the things they could to check this document on the security side. We have not found any indication of widespread laxity, however.

Q Do I understand that there were three cases, a typewriter case, the 1959 document, and the shipment of the drawer full of papers?

A That's correct.

Q Can you be sure there were no more?

A We found internally that there was also a shipment from INR that was transferred from one office of INR to another, again, as part of this microfilming project. There was no compromise of the classified material because it went from one office to another where the people were cleared to handle it.

Q How did you find out about the typewriters?  
That's not clear in any of this.

A My understanding is that when these arrived at Lorton, were set up at Lorton, and started to operate, that information was called up out of <sup>one of</sup> the auxiliary memories.

I don't know whether it was classified information that was  
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C-3

called up there or not. Again, this is something that will come out, we hope, in the FBI report. But it was when we found out that there was some information there -- this was within days of the discovery of the other material<sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ we were so sensitive to this that we just pulled all the typewriters back and sent them through a laboratory check.

Q Mr. Secretary, you were talking about three individuals, and you were talking about disciplinary action and procedural changes, and so on. But there is a head of Security, there is a head of Management, there is a head of Administration in this building. If the procedures were not right to begin with, are any of those higher-up officials going to suffer disciplinary action or suffer in any way for this breach of security? Or is it going to be limited to three, perhaps fairly low-level employees who perhaps were involved in carting the cabinets to Lorton --

Q -- whose rank you can't give us today?

A I'll tell you I'm suffering now, if that's any compensation. (Laughter) I think this is very interesting; it's a philosophical question here as to what extent. I think it is clear that we have to tighten up our procedures, and we've taken steps to do that.

Q How about discipline, though? That's what the question was all about. Are any of the management responsible

2-4 for (1) procedures and (2) presumably policing what personnel are doing. Are they going to be disciplined in any way?

A Let me say that I'm not sure to what extent anybody is going to be disciplined in this process. Recommendations for discipline have to be considered. All of these employees have their rights and the opportunity to present their own defenses. And at this point, the question of discipline is very much an open question -- it has not been resolved.

Q For the higher-level officials as well as the lower-level officials -- unresolved?

A I think the whole question of discipline is an open question that's never --

Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you give us an example of how there could be damage to the U.S. national security as a result of these developments?

A That really gets difficult. I couldn't speculate on the possible ways that that could have happened.

Q Well, could you characterize the degree of sensitivity of these documents for us?

A Yes. I think we would characterize these as sensitive documents.

Q The highest sensitivity?

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A I'm not sure what that means. These were sensitive documents.

Q Sir, you were not fully responsive to Mr. Begleiter's question. You only mentioned three -- you used the specific number of three persons who were up for some kind of disciplinary proceedings -- maybe. These, we assume, are not senior persons in any way. Is that correct? At the level of top management?

A Senior persons -- oh, level of top management. I don't know who these people are, but it's my understanding that they are not top management in that context, no.

Q You would know if they were Ron Spire<sup>is</sup> or if they were Robert Lamb or if they were Larry Eagleburger, or any of those who have administrative responsibilities in the Department, wouldn't you?

A I would not. But I have not been informed that it is Robert Lamb.

Q Mr. Secretary, the point is that if this were a business community and there had been a massive foy<sup>l</sup>-up, and industrial secrets had been disbursed, top management would be chopped.

A O.K. I'm not sure. Let me/quite honest with you on this. I'm not sure to what extent you could lay the blame in this particular instance on top management. These

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were cases where the procedures were there, the mechanisms were there, and these procedures were not followed by individual employees. Now, we would look to management if there were some bigger question of, maybe that these procedures were not there, that the security measures were not there. That is not what happened in this case. That's not what happened at all.

Q How long ago was the last full review of the efficacy of these procedures by top management?

A Oh, I think that's a continuing process.

Q Well, then, management, in fact, then had its oar in, at least philosophically?

A Absolutely. <sup>absolutely</sup> Management in this case -- and let me say that if we came up with the fact that these security procedures were, in fact, inadequate, that this was the kind of thing that would be a recurring event, then I think that we would look <sup>at</sup> different places. But the security procedures were right there.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you saying, in a word, that this all happened because of carelessness by three, perhaps more, State Department employees, that it was just carelessness, sloppiness, not following procedures? Do you have any reason at all to believe anything else about <sup>anything else being</sup> anybody involved?

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ex If you had to put it in a word, what would you say  
caused it -- carelessness, sloppiness?

A Yes, I think we have to attribute this to  
sloppiness. There's no question.

Q What did specifically happen? Was someone  
supposed to check every file drawer, and he didn't do it --  
some one person was supposed to do that, and he didn't do it?  
What specifically happened to cause this?

A -- There was a system of checks and double  
checks on files, on the disposition of classified material  
that did not occur.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

(The briefing concluded at 3:30 p.m.)